Analysis
Greece-Egypt EEZ agreement explained: what the 2020 deal says
The 2020 Greece-Egypt treaty delimits part of the two countries' exclusive economic zones. Here is what it says, what it leaves open and why it is back in the news.
The Greece-Egypt EEZ agreement is a treaty signed in Cairo on 6 August 2020 that sets the boundary between the exclusive economic zones of the two countries in part of the Eastern Mediterranean. It is a “partial delimitation”: it fixes the line between Crete and Rhodes on one side and Egypt’s western coast on the other, and leaves the sea further east for later talks. Those talks are now back in the news, because Libya’s House of Representatives has ratified the Turkish-Libyan memorandum that cuts across the same waters.
Key points
- Signed on 6 August 2020, in force on 2 September 2020 after the exchange of ratification instruments, and registered with the United Nations.
- Only part of the sea is delimited; the area south of Kastellorizo towards Egypt remains open, and Athens and Cairo are discussing how to extend the line.
- Greece treats the deal as grounded in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), whose Article 121(2) gives islands the same zones as other land territory.
- Turkey calls the agreement “null and void” and is not a party to UNCLOS; Egypt rejects the Turkish-Libyan memorandum of 2019.
What does the Greece-Egypt EEZ agreement say?
The UN Treaty Collection lists the text as an “Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between the two countries”, registered under number 56237, with Greek, English and Arabic as authentic texts and an annex and map attached. It entered into force on 2 September 2020 by the exchange of the instruments of ratification, as Article 5 provides.
According to a study by the research service of the German Bundestag, negotiations began in 2005, after hydrocarbons were discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean. Under Article 1, the boundary runs along points listed in Annex 1 and shown on a chart. It divides a corridor that stretches from Crete and Rhodes in the north to the coast of western Egypt in the south. The same study notes that Article 1(b) itself speaks of a “partial delimitation”.
Two further clauses matter for what comes next. Article 1(d) allows the line to be revised if either country later delimits its zone with a third state, and Article 1(e) says that a party negotiating with such a state, “before reaching the final agreement with the third State, shall notify and consult the other Party” (text as quoted by the Bundestag study). In plain terms, Athens and Cairo built in a route for extension and for coordination.
What is an exclusive economic zone, and who has one?
Under UNCLOS Article 57 an exclusive economic zone “shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured”. Inside it the coastal state holds sovereign rights to explore and exploit the resources. Where the 200-mile limits of two states overlap, as they do across much of the Eastern Mediterranean, the zones must be delimited.
Article 74(1) sets the method: delimitation “shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law” in order “to achieve an equitable solution”. If no agreement is reached within a reasonable time, Article 74(2) sends the states to the dispute procedures of Part XV. Greece, Cyprus and Egypt are parties to the Convention; Turkey, Libya, Israel and Syria are not, according to the Bundestag study.
Why do islands decide the argument?
Greece’s case rests on Article 121(2): “the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.” Crete, Rhodes and Kastellorizo are islands, so on Athens’ reading they carry full zones. Article 121(3), which denies zones to rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life, is a separate provision about rocks, not about inhabited islands.
The Bundestag’s scientific service examined the Turkish counter-argument that Greek islands lying beyond the median line, Kastellorizo among them, generate no EEZ. It concluded that this view contradicts the prevailing opinion in the literature and in case law, and it cited the International Court of Justice judgment in Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012). The same study observes that the Turkish-Libyan memorandum raises considerably larger legal questions about the interests of a third country than the Greek-Egyptian treaty does, because it ignores the regime of Crete and Rhodes, which lie between Turkey and Libya.
How does it compare with Egypt’s other maritime treaties?
| Agreement | Date | Method | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cyprus-Egypt EEZ treaty | 17 February 2003 | Median line, points 1 to 8, equidistant from the baselines | Both parties to UNCLOS; Article 1(e) lets points 1 and 8 be reviewed after delimitation with other neighbours |
| Greece-Egypt EEZ treaty | 6 August 2020 | Partial delimitation along points in Annex 1 | In force since 2 September 2020; registered with the UN |
| Turkey-Libya memorandum | 27 November 2019 | Memorandum on “maritime jurisdiction areas” between Turkey and Libya’s then Tripoli-based government | Turkey says it took effect on 8 December 2019; Greece, Cyprus and Egypt reject it |
What does Greece say?
On the day of signing, the then foreign minister Nikos Dendias said the accord “confirms and secures the right and influence of our islands on a continental shelf and in an Exclusive Economic Zone”, and described it as “the exact opposite of the illegal, null and void memorandum of understanding between Turkey and Tripoli”. Both quotations come from his statement as reproduced in the Bundestag study.
Greece’s line today is the same: delimitation by agreement, in line with international law, and islands that count. On 25 October Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis named strong alliances, dialogue and legally binding agreements as Greece’s answer to revisionism, with Egypt as the example, as we reported in Mitsotakis: strong alliances, dialogue and legally binding agreements are Greece’s answer to revisionism, with Egypt as the example.
What is Ankara’s case?
Ankara argues the opposite, and its position is worth stating precisely because it rests on a text Turkey has not joined. Turkey’s foreign ministry said on the day of signing that “a maritime boundary between Greece and Egypt does not exist” and that the agreement was “null and void”, adding that the area lies “within the Turkish continental shelf as declared to the United Nations” (press release No. 165, as quoted in the Bundestag study). It also claimed that Egypt gave up 11,500 square kilometres under its 2003 treaty with Cyprus, a figure that is Ankara’s own.
The Turkish submission to the United Nations, circulated as document A/74/757 on 18 March 2020, says the outer limit of the Turkish continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean follows the median line between the Turkish and Egyptian coastlines to a point west of 28 degrees east. It also states that the Turkish-Libyan memorandum rests on the principle that “islands cannot have a cut-off effect on the coastal projection of Turkey”. The Bundestag study adds that, as a matter of law, a treaty between two states cannot be invoked against a third state, and that neither the Greek-Egyptian nor the Turkish-Libyan text cancels the other.
That last point is why Athens and Cairo keep pressing the matter diplomatically and why Greece wants the remaining zones settled by agreement or, failing that, before a court. Turkey has not accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and a case needs both sides’ consent, as the Bundestag study also notes.
What is happening now?
Egypt’s foreign ministry rejected the Libyan ratification of the memorandum on 21 October, saying that it has no legal effect for Cairo and violates UNCLOS. The next day Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis and his Egyptian counterpart Badr Abdelatty agreed to continue consultations on extending the Greek-Egyptian delimitation. Turkey’s defence minister Yaşar Güler then offered Cairo a deal with Turkey that, he claimed, would give Egypt about 15,000 square kilometres more than an agreement with Greece, a claim Greece does not accept; we covered it in Turkish defence minister Güler courts Cairo: a maritime deal with Turkey would give Egypt “15,000 sq km more” than one with Greece.
For background on the rival text and on the law, see our explainers The Turkey-Libya maritime memorandum explained and UNCLOS explained: sea zones, islands and the Aegean dispute, and on the threat of war that Ankara attaches to a 12-mile Greek limit, Casus belli explained: Turkey’s 1995 threat of war against Greece.
Frequently asked questions
Does it cover the whole sea between Greece and Egypt? No. Article 1(b) calls it a partial delimitation, and the waters east of the delimited corridor, south of Kastellorizo, remain open.
Does it cancel the Turkish-Libyan memorandum? Greece calls that memorandum null and void and says the new treaty buried it. As a matter of treaty law, the Bundestag’s lawyers note, one bilateral treaty cannot annul another between different states, which is why the argument continues in diplomacy and, potentially, before a court.
Sources: UN Treaty Collection, registration 56237; UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, text; Scientific Services of the German Bundestag, WD 2-3000-074/20 (in German); UN document A/74/757; Cyprus-Egypt EEZ agreement, 2003.