Post-quantum cryptography: 31 questions from ASD, CISA and NSA for technology vendors

Anyone buying software, cloud services or devices with built-in encryption will soon need to ask their vendor one simple thing: will the product be ready for post-quantum cryptography (PQC), that is, for algorithms that withstand quantum computers as well? To help organisations, the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) of the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) published on Thursday, November 5, 2026 an updated edition of its guide of questions to vendors, in cooperation with the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the National Security Agency (NSA). CISA posted the guide on its own site the same day, together with a summary checklist for quick reference.

The new edition has more background, a clearer explanation of the transition and applies to a wider range of organisations. Its starting point is the risk from a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC), a machine powerful enough to break the public-key cryptography that protects communications and sensitive data today. Many organisations do not choose the algorithms themselves, since the vendor implements them, so the vendor’s readiness determines when the transition will be completed.

Five tables of questions

There are 31 questions, divided into five tables that follow the stages of ASD’s LATICE framework. The first stage is discovery and inventory: the vendor should have a cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM) and say whether there is cryptography “locked” in software or hardware, such as firmware signatures and hardware roots of trust, which often change only by replacing the device. Next comes risk assessment: which data flows rely on traditional cryptography and for how many years the data must stay confidential. The “harvest now, decrypt later” threat means that encrypted traffic recorded today may be read once the right computer exists.

At the prioritisation stage the three agencies ask for specific dates: which products will be ready for post-quantum cryptography so that customers can deploy them before the end of 2030, and which components require hardware replacement or a new architecture. Hybrid solutions, combining post-quantum and traditional algorithms, are accepted only as a temporary measure, with a written timeline for moving to exclusively post-quantum operation. The order in which the vendor serves its customers must be based on their exposure and the sensitivity of their data, not on their size or revenue.

For implementation, the questions concern which algorithms will be supported and when, whether the solution is production-ready, how cryptographic libraries are tested and how key and certificate sizes change. They also ask whether post-quantum cryptography is included in the basic licence, so that it is not charged as an extra option. The last table covers customer communication, transition guides, training of support teams and the path to retiring traditional cryptography.

The agencies do not expect every organisation to put all the questions to every vendor. The scope is adjusted to the product’s risk, the degree to which the vendor controls the cryptography and the lifetime of the data. Cited as warning signs are generic assurances, vague or deferred timelines, proprietary and opaque cryptography, and excessive reliance on compensating controls.

Particular weight is given to installed equipment. In industrial control, access control and network devices, cryptography is often embedded and hard to update, so replacing the equipment may be necessary. These are the same type of systems already in the crosshairs of attacks on industrial controllers, about which CISA recently warned. Quantum computers are also among the technologies covered by the new “CISA 2030” strategy.