Greece vs Turkey military spending: what NATO and SIPRI data show

Turkey spends about three times as much on defence as Greece in absolute terms, but Greece devotes a larger share of its economy to it. NATO’s 2026 estimates put Greek core defence spending at 3.65% of GDP and Turkey’s at 2.85%, while SIPRI’s 2025 figures show $30.0 billion for Turkey against $8.4 billion for Greece.

Key points

• NATO estimates for 2026 (cut-off 3 July 2026): Greece 3.65% of GDP, above the 3.5% core guideline; Turkey 2.85%.
• In real terms Greece has almost doubled its core defence spending since 2014, while Turkey has more than tripled its own from a lower share of GDP.
• SIPRI ranks Turkey 18th and Greece 34th in the world for military spending in 2025.
• Greece’s imported arms come overwhelmingly from France and the United States; Turkey’s imports are falling while its own arms exports are growing.

What do NATO’s 2026 figures say?

NATO publishes the most comparable data for the two neighbours, because both report under the same definitions. In its defence investment report for 2014-2026, with a cut-off of 3 July 2026, figures for 2025 and 2026 are estimates. The table below uses NATO’s core defence expenditure in constant 2021 prices and exchange rates.

The report says that five Allies are expected to meet the 3.5% guideline for core defence in 2026. Reading the country table, Greece is one of them, alongside Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. At the 2025 Hague Summit Allies committed to invest 5% of GDP annually on core defence requirements and defence- and security-related investment by 2035. For NATO Europe and Canada as a whole, core spending is estimated at 2.53% of GDP in 2026, so both Greece and Turkey are above the European average.

What does SIPRI show for 2025?

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute counts spending differently from NATO, so its percentages should not be mixed with the table above. In its April 2026 fact sheet, SIPRI puts Turkey’s military expenditure at $30.0 billion in 2025, up 7.2% on 2024 and 94% on 2016, or 1.9% of GDP. Greece is at $8.4 billion, up 5.6% on 2024 and 35% on 2016, which SIPRI measures as 3.0% of GDP, up from 2.6% the year before.

SIPRI attributes Turkey’s increase to its continuing military operations in Iraq, Somalia and Syria, “but most of all” to investment in its domestic arms industry. Allocations to the special fund that supports the Turkish arms industry rose by 25% in a year and made up 22% of total Turkish military expenditure in 2025.

Who supplies the weapons?

The pattern of arms imports differs sharply. In SIPRI’s March 2026 fact sheet on arms transfers, Greece was the 19th largest importer of major arms in 2021-25 with 1.5% of the global total, 295% more than in 2016-20. France supplied 68% of Greek imports, the United States 17% and Italy 4.4%. Greece is also the third largest recipient of French arms exports, taking 10% of them.

Turkey ranked 24th among importers with 1.2% of the world total, 9.7% less than in the previous five years. Its main suppliers were Germany (31%), Spain (29%) and Italy (19%). At the same time Turkey became the 11th largest arms exporter, with 1.8% of the global share and an increase of 122% over 2016-20.

Why do the two datasets differ?

NATO states in its report that its figures are based on each Ally’s ministry of defence submissions under agreed definitions, and that they “may considerably diverge” from those published by national authorities or given in national budgets. Its estimates for 2025 and 2026 also depend on the economic and demographic data of the European Commission, the IMF and the OECD. SIPRI publishes its own series. That is why Turkey appears at 1.9% of GDP in SIPRI’s 2025 count and at 2.85% in NATO’s 2026 estimate. The two numbers describe different years and different definitions, and neither is an error.

What the numbers do and do not show

These datasets measure money, not capability. They say nothing about readiness, stockpiles, training or the quality of what is bought, and a larger budget does not by itself decide how a confrontation would go. What the figures do show is the shape of the problem for Athens, drawn from the stated numbers.

First, the burden. Greece asks more of its economy than Turkey does, by NATO’s count and by SIPRI’s, and has done so for longer: 2.24% of GDP in 2014 against Turkey’s 1.44%. Second, the gap in volume. With a budget roughly three times larger on NATO’s numbers, Turkey can fund a domestic industry on a scale Greece does not have, which helps explain why Greek procurement leans on partners and allied suppliers. Third, the dependence that follows: France and the United States account for 85% of Greek arms imports in SIPRI’s period.

The context for Greek spending is its own neighbour. The Turkish parliament’s 1995 resolution, which Athens regards as a standing threat of war over the extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 miles, is covered in our explainer Casus belli explained: Turkey’s 1995 threat of war against Greece. Where the money goes is covered in our analyses Analysis: Achilles Shield, what capabilities Greece is buying from Israel, when it arrives and how it answers Turkey’s “Steel Dome” and Analysis: the Bergamini frigates, why the Hellenic Navy wanted them so urgently and what they change against the Turkish fleet .

Sources

NATO, Defence Investment of NATO Countries (2014-2026); SIPRI, Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025; SIPRI, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025.